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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2330 
___________ 
 
TOMOKO FUNAYAMA, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
NICHIA AMERICA CORPORATION;  
KUBONIWA SHIGEO 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 08-cv-05599) 
District Judge:  Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 16, 2012 
 
Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE and BARRY, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed: May 17, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Tomoko Funayama, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment for 
her former employer, Nichia America Corporation, and its President, Shigeo Kuboniwa, 
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in her employment discrimination action.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
 Funayama began working for Nichia as a Business Coordinator/Accountant in 
1995.  She was promoted to the positions of Assistant Financial Manager in 1998 and 
Financial Manager in 2004.  In 2008, Nichia decided to close the Mountville, 
Pennsylvania office where Funayama worked and to consolidate its operations in Detroit 
the following year.  Kuboniwa initially told Funayama that she would not be transferred 
to Detroit, but he later offered her a job there.  Before the terms of the position had been 
decided, Funayama began looking for another job.  She accepted employment at another 
company and resigned from Nichia on July 22, 2008.   
 Funayama claims Nichia discriminated against her based on her gender, age, and 
Japanese ethnicity in connection with her job offer and retaliated against her for filing 
discrimination charges.  She further contends that Kuboniwa sexually harassed her 
throughout her employment and subjected her to a hostile work environment.  Funayama 
claims violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Stat. §§ 951 et seq., and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq
 Following discovery, Nichia moved for summary judgment on Funayama’s 
claims.  The District Court granted the motion and this appeal followed.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our standard of review is plenary.  
. 
Watson v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 854 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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 As recognized by the District Court, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer 
“to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin[.]”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).  “Hostile work 
environment harassment occurs when unwelcome sexual conduct unreasonably interferes 
with a person’s performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working 
environment.”  Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 425-26 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing 
Meritor Savs. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)).  The harassment must be so 
severe or pervasive that it changes the conditions of employment and creates an abusive 
environment.  Id.
 As discussed in further detail in the District Court’s decision, Funayama testified 
that Kuboniwa, among other things, made sexual advances towards her outside the office  
in 1999, suggested they share a room on a business trip in 2001, gave her a sexually 
explicit book in 2003 and a sexually explicit magazine in 2007, and made a comment 
about her body in 2008.  Funayama also stated that Kuboniwa asked to go to her 
apartment for a drink many times from 1999 until 2003, when on the advice of a human 
resources employee, she clearly declined an invitation.  Funayama further testified that 
Kuboniwa had touched her on the back and side of her body during the period from 2003 
to 2008.   
 at 426.    
 The District Court considered the totality of these circumstances, including the 
frequency of the conduct, whether it was physically threatening or humiliating or simply 
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offensive, and whether it unreasonably interfered with Funayama’s work performance.  
See id.
 The handful of incidents Funayama states occurred from 1999 until 2003 were not 
sufficiently severe or frequent to support a hostile work environment claim.  The only 
ongoing conduct Funayama advanced in support of her claim were Kuboniwa’s 
invitations to go out with him, which stopped in 2003 once she clearly declined them, and 
his touching of her back and side, which Funayama did not find overly offensive at the 
time.  Funayama did not testify that these incidents had any effect on her work and, as 
noted by the District Court, she stated that sexual harassment was not the reason she 
resigned.  Funayama has not shown that the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment for the defendants on this claim.
 (noting factors that are considered to determine if an environment is hostile or 
abusive).  The District Court concluded that Funayama failed to show that she suffered 
severe and pervasive harassment creating an objectively abusive working environment.  
We agree.   
1
 Funayama also challenges the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on her 
other discrimination claims.  The District Court properly applied the burden shifting 
framework set forth in 
  
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green
                                              
1Nichia and Kuboniwa also assert in their brief that Funayama’s hostile work 
environment claim is time-barred.  Because the incidents Funayama described are 
insufficient to establish a hostile work environment claim, we need not decide the 
timeliness of her claim.  
, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  Under 
this framework, Funayama was required to establish a prima facie case of discrimination 
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by showing:  (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the 
position she sought to attain or retain; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; 
and (4) the action occurred under circumstances that give rise to an unlawful inference of 
discrimination.  See Jones v. School Dist. of Philadelphia
 The District Court concluded that Funayama failed to establish a prima facie case 
of discrimination because she had not shown that she suffered an adverse employment 
action.  The District Court explained that Funayama did not provide evidence showing 
that the position she would assume in Detroit so materially altered her benefits or duties 
that it could be characterized as adverse.  Rather, the District Court found that Funayama 
was initially dissatisfied with Nichia’s failure to answer her questions about the structure 
of the new department in Detroit and later with being given essentially the same duties 
she had in Pennsylvania. 
, 198 F.3d 403, 410-11 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
 The record reflects that Kuboniwa initially planned to transfer Funayama’s 
supervisor, Tim Ujike, to Detroit for a temporary period of time after which he would 
work for Nichia in Japan.  On May 7, 2008, Kuboniwa told Funayama that she would not 
be transferred to Detroit.  Funayama testified at her deposition that Kuboniwa further told 
her that Nichia’s Detroit location did not want Japanese individuals to work there and that 
a young, white, male accountant she supervised, Brian Marshall, would ultimately head 
up the accounting department. 
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 Several weeks later, however, Ujike resigned and, on May 28, 2008, Kuboniwa 
offered Funayama a position in Detroit.  Kuboniwa testified that he did not know at this 
time how the accounting department would be structured except that it had been decided 
that the department would be reduced from five persons to three.  Brian Marshall was 
offered a position in Detroit in June 2008.   
 At a June 25, 2008, meeting, Kuboniwa showed Marshall and Funayama a chart 
reflecting the accounting assignments each would assume after Ujike’s departure.  As 
recognized by the District Court, the chart reflects that ten of Funayama’s duties would 
remain the same and that she would assume one duty that Ujike had performed.  In 
addition, Marshall would assume one of Funayama’s duties and share one of her duties.  
Funayama also would share with Marshall two duties she had shared with Ujike.  
Funayama viewed these changes as a demotion and believed that her job would become 
clerical in nature.   
 The chart does not reflect a substantial change in Funayama’s assignments and 
Funayama points to no other evidence supporting the conclusion that there would be a 
qualitative change in her position.2  Absent such evidence, we agree with the District 
Court that, once Funayama was offered a position in Detroit, there was no longer an 
adverse employment action supporting a prima facie case of discrimination.  See 
                                              
2There is conflicting evidence as to whether Funayama would continue to 
supervise Marshall.  Funayama testified she would not but Kuboniwa testified that the 
reporting structure had yet to be determined. 
Storey 
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v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 390 F.3d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating an adverse 
employment action requires an action by an employer that is “serious and tangible 
enough to alter an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment”).3
 We further agree, for substantially the reasons stated by the District Court, that 
summary judgment was warranted on Funayama’s retaliation and constructive discharge 
claims.  Funayama has not shown any error on the part of the District Court.   
  
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.4
                                              
3We recognize that the chart reflects that Marshall would assume the majority of 
Ujike’s duties when he resigned.  Funayama, however, does not contend in her brief that 
she should have been assigned Ujike’s duties nor does she develop an argument that she 
suffered an adverse employment action based on changes in Marshall’s position. 
 
 
4Funayama’s motion for leave to attach a translator’s report in the supplemental 
appendix accompanying her reply brief is denied.  Funayama’s motion is also construed 
as a motion to file the supplemental appendix accompanying her reply brief and, so 
construed, is granted. 
